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 much a blurring as a multiplication of political lines during the past few generations. If the defeat and dismantling of the European empires in the twentieth century and the emergence of new nations as well as supranational institutions in their place has led to anything, it has been to the further convergence of politics and diplomacy. As more states grow more disinclined to wage war, diplomacy has also grown more coterminous with statecraft. The diplomat’s traditional assets of adaptability to circumstances, empathy, and intuition are needed as much as they ever have been. 

The Shape of Diplomacy

 Knowing how adaptable and innovative diplomacy has been historically, it is striking that no ‘new’ diplomacy has emerged in nearly a century. It may be possible, as the aforementioned remarks by George Kennan suggest, that Wilson was so far ahead of his time, politics have merely caught up with the theory, ideology, and principles he espoused. Indeed, it is hard to contemplate a greater standard for statecraft than universal virtue; there is, by definition, no larger canvas on which to paint a desirable world order. Yet, this is a relative judgment. A verdict on the Old Diplomacy—and here we speak, again, narrowly of only European diplomacy during that period—may have been roughly equivalent in novelty. Just as we cannot know the precise future evolution of global politics, we cannot know how precisely diplomats will adapt to it. We may insist, however, that adaptation shall happen somehow or, if not, politics and diplomacy will just cease to progress. One of the advantages of diplomatic tradition comes from this paradox: it is always adjusting to the world around it, yet it does so slowly, almost imperceptibly. Aspects of diplomacy that are now taken for granted—the summit, for example—have evolved accordingly. Whereas, during the Cold War they scaled up, as the name suggests, to the level of heads of state, in the past couple of decades they have scaled back down, so that it is not uncommon to see ‘summits’ of interior or environmental ministers, or even without any ministers at all, as the large number of non-governmental organization conferences, nearly all professing to influence or even make policy, probably would attest. Whether or not such activity rises to the level of statecraft, or even produces the political change it seeks, is open to question. What is less in doubt is the disorder that has accompanied it. Disorder is not just the result of greater numbers of people trying to do more things at once; it is also the result of another paradox. Popular summits in lieu of traditional diplomacy are, on the surface, apolitical, or sometimes proto-political. Their organizers seek to supplant the roles of diplomats and other state actors in the name of transcending