aqoonsiga somaliland

 

Somaliland waxay wajahaysaa caqabado badan iyo fursado horumarineed si ay u hesho aqoonsi caalami ah iyo xasilooni gobolka. Halkan waxaa ku qoran qaar ka mid ah arrimaha muhiimka ah ee Somaliland u baahan tahay inay qaado si ay u gaarto himilooyinkeeda:

 

### 1. **Dhimista Khilaafaadka Gudaha:**

   - Somaliland waxay u baahan tahay inay hagaajiso isfahamka dhexmara qaybaha kala duwan ee bulshada, si loo dhiso midnimo iyo xasilooni bulshada dhexdeeda.

 

### 2. **Horumarinta Hay'adaha Dowliga:**

   - Somaliland waxay u baahan tahay inay xoojiso hay'adaha dowliga ah, si loo hubiyo in adeegyada aasaasiga ah sida caafimaadka, waxbarashada, iyo amniga si hufan loo bixiyo.

 

### 3. **Korodhsiga Dhaqaalaha:**

   - Horumarinta dhaqaalaha Somaliland waxay muhiim u tahay horumarka dalka. Tan waxaa ka mid ah:

     - Kobcinta ganacsiga iyo maalgashiga.

     - Horumarinta kaabayaasha, sida wadooyinka, dekedaha, iyo garoomada diyaaradaha.

     - Kordhinta wax-soo-saarka agriculture (beeraha) iyo xoolaha, maadaama ay udub-dhexaad u yihiin dhaqaalaha.

 

### 4. **Xoojinta Amniga:**

   - Somaliland waxay u baahan tahay inay xoojiso hay'adaha amniga iyo booliska si loo sugo amniga guud ee bulshada, loona yareeyo khataraha ka imanaya kooxo hubeysan ama xagjiriin.

 

### 5. **Aqoonta iyo Waxbarashada:**

   - Horumarinta waxbarashada iyo wax-soo-saarka aqoonyahanka waxay muhiim u tahay horumarka Somaliland, iyadoo la dhisayo dugsiyo tayo leh, jaamacado, iyo fursado tababar.

 

### 6. **Xiriirinta Caalamiga ah:**

   - Somaliland waxay u baahan tahay inay horumariso xiriirka caalamiga ah, gaar ahaan dalalka taageeri kara. Tani waxay ka mid tahay:

     - Ka qaybqaadashada ururrada caalamiga ah iyo kooxaha bulshada.

     - La sameynta heshiisyo dhaqaale iyo siyaasadeed.

 

### 7. **Soo Dhoweynta Qaxootiga iyo Barakacayaasha:**

   - Somaliland waxay u baahan tahay inay taageerto barakacayaasha iyo qaxootiga, si ay u helaan fursado nololeed oo wanaagsan. Taasi waxay ka caawin kartaa bulshooyinka inay la qabsadaan xaalada jirta.

 

### 8. **Dhimista Faqriga:**

   - Somaliland waxay u baahan tahay inay la tacaasho faqriga, iyadoo la abuurayo fursado shaqo iyo taageero bulshada danyarta ah si loo yareeyo sinnaan la'aanta dhaqaale.

 

### 9. **Isgaadhsiinta iyo Teknolojiyada:**

   - Horumarinta isgaadhsiinta iyo kaabayaasha tiknoolojiyadda si ay u fududeyso is-dhexgalka bulshada iyo ganacsiga.

 

### 10. **Cudurada iyo Caafimaadka:**

   - Kor u qaadista adeegyada caafimaadka iyo wacyi-gelinta cudurada sida HIV/AIDS, tuberculoses, iyo cuduro kale ayaa muhiim u ah bulshada.

 

### Gabagabo:

Haddii Somaliland ay qaado tillaabooyinka kor ku xusan, waxay u suurtagelin kartaa inay hesho aqoonsi caalami ah, laakiin sidoo kale waxay kor u qaadi kartaa nolosha dadka iyo xasiloonida gobolka. Horumarkaan wuxuu u baahan yahay qorshayaal cad, hawlgalada wadajirka ah ee bulshada, iyo taageero dibadda ah.

 

Haddii aad su'aalo kale qabto ama aad rabto faahfaahin dheeri ah, fadlan ii soo sheeg!

Arrinta la xiriirta hadday Itoobiya ku dhisato marin dhul ah, iyo in la siiyo 20 kiilomitir oo badda Somaliland ah, waxay ka kooban tahay arrimo badan—kaas oo ay ka mid yihiin sharciga caalamiga ah, siyaasadda gobolka, iyo isbedelka saameynta leh ee khilaafaadka.

 

### 1. **Xidhiidhka Caalamiga ah:**

   - Sharciga caalamiga ah, gaar ahaan heshiisyada iyo waxyaabaha la xiriira badaha, ayaa dhaqan-gal ah. Qodobo caalami ah, sida Qaramada Midoobay iyo Golaha Amaanka, waxay qeexaan xuquuqda dalalka badan, si gaar ah marka ay timaaddo sidoo kale marinada, badda, iyo xudduudaha.

   - Haddii Somaliland ay aqbasho inay bixiso kaabayaasha badda oo ay siiso 20 kiilomitir oo badeed Itoobiya, waxaa laga yaabaa inay u baahan tahay in la raaco sharciga caalamiga ah, oo ay ku jiraan heshiisyo cad oo qoran, taasoo suuro galin karta in la waafajiyo shuruudaha xuquuqda badda.

 

### 2. **Dhibaatada Siyaasadeed:**

   - Arrintani waxay keeni kartaa in Somaliland ay la kulanto culeysyo siyaasadeed oo ka imaanaya gudaha iyo dibadda. Qaybaha qaar ka mid ah bulshada Somaliland ayaa u arki kara inuu yahay kadis ama awoodi waa la saarey, taasoo dhalin karta xasarad bulsho.

   - Sidoo kale, haddii Somaliland ay oggolaato in qayb ka mid ah badda la siiyo, waxay ka dhigi kartaa go'aankan kuwo aan raali ka ahayn bulshada, taasoo waxaa ka dhici karta qaska siyaasadeed ama muujin khilaaf cusub.

 

### 3. **Tusaalayaal Taariikhi ah:**

   - Taariikhda, waxaa jiray tusaalooyin sharciga caalamiga ah oo la xiriira badda iyo xudduudaha. Tusaale ahaan, dalal badan ayaa waxaa dhacay heshiisyo la xiriira marinno iyo baddo, hase yeeshee, intooda badan waxay socdaan iyadoo la raacayo sharciga caalamiga ah.

   - Kaliya ma ahan in la dhiso marin dhul aan sharciga la waafaqsanayn, laakiin sidoo kale waxaa lagama maarmaan ah in heshiisyo dhameystiran oo labada dhinac ah la dhiso si cadaalad ah.

 

### 4. **Mustaqbalka:**

   - Haddii Itoobiya ay aqoonsato Somaliland ka dib, waxay dhisi kartaa fursado cusub oo laga faa'iidaysto, laakiin tani waxay u baahan doontaa in la sameeyo heshiisyo qoran oo labada dhinac ah, si loo xasiliyo xiriirka, loona hubiyo in taladaan aanay saameyn xun u yeelan doonin gobolka.

   - Iskaashiga iyo heshiisyo joogta ah waxay noqon karaan kuwo faa'iido leh, laakiin arrimahan waxay u baahan yihiin wadashaqeyn, isfahan, iyo aqbalid ka imanaysa dhinacyada.

 

### Gabagabo:

Haddii Somaliland ay aqbasho in Itoobiya la siiyo marin dhul ah oo ah 20 kiilomitir oo ka tirsan badda Somaliland, waxay u baahan tahay in la raaco sharciga caalamiga ah, waxaana loo baahan yahay in shuruudahaas si cad loogu qeexo heshiis rasmi ah. Waxa kale oo muhiim ah in la tixgeliyo dareenka bulshada Somaliland iyo ra'yiga arrintaan la xiriira.

 

Haddii aad hayso su'aalo kale oo gaar ah oo ku saabsan mowqifka Somaliland ama hannaanka sharciga caalamiga ah, fadlan ha ka labalabeyn inaad weydiiso!

HORUMARKA HABKA AQOONSIGU

IMPROVEMENTS IN THE PROCESS OF RECOGNITION

Collectivization of the Process of Recognition. The preceding criticism of the declaratory view of recognition does not imply that the present position under which existing States in compliance with a legal duty fulfill the function of recognition with a constitutive effect, is satisfactory and that it ought to be perpetuated. It is true that an acknowledged and decisive infusion of the element of national interest has not been a typical feature of the process of recognition. But, as has been shown,0 6 the exceptions are frequent and disquieting. Neither is it possible to ignore the political implications and repercussions of the process of recognition, even when it takes place in the fulfillment of a duty owed to international society and to the community in question. The dual position of the recognizing State as an organ administering international law and as a guardian of its own interest must reveal itself in a disturbing fashion whenever there is an occasion for successfully using the weapon of recognition for the purpose of achieving political advantages. Situations will arise in which a State may see in the manner of the exercise of the function of recognition an opportunity for securing for itself benefits from the parent State or from the community claiming recognition. Consideration of such benefits cannot be regarded as legitimate, but it cannot always be absent in the decision of the recognizing State. It would be futile to deny either the existence of the difficulty or the fact that it is due to an obvious imperfection of international organization. The solution of that difficulty would seem to lie in transferring that function to an international organ not laboring under the conflict between interest and duty. An innovation of this nature would also abolish the glaring anomaly of a community existing as a State in relation to some but not to other States

Collectivization of the process of recognition depends clearly upon a high degree of political integration of the international community in the form of an international organization of States. Recognition of States, though consisting in the application of a legal principle and in the ascertainment of the existence of conditions of statehood as laid down by international law, could and probably ought to be placed, in view of its political implications, within the competence of the highest executive and legislative organs. The thorough collectivization of recognition in this way would be possible only if the international organization were both universal and compulsory, that is, an organization to which by a sovereign act of international legislation all States would be made to adhere and from which there could be neither withdrawal nor expulsion. An international organization which is not universal would make possible the collectivization of recognition only in the mutual relations of its members, though, politically, the authority of such recognition would extend outside the scope of its membership. In a universal international organization on a compulsory basis recognition by an appropriate majority of its highest organs corresponding to the Council or Assembly of the League of Nations would automatically involve membership. In an international organization which is not universal or in which membership is voluntary, admission by the competent organ would automatically involve recognition by all the members of the organization. The position would have to be made clear by a constitutional provision lifting the fact of automatic recognition above the uncertainty and the controversy with which it was surrounded in the Covenant of the League of Nations. Development in the direction of collectivization of recognition may be facilitated by the realization that instances of collective recognition are not absent from international practice-to mention only the cases of recognition of Greece by the Treaty of London of 1830, of Belgium by the Treaty of London of 1831, of the German Empire by the Protocol of London of 1871, of the Balkan States by the Berlin Treaty of 1878, of the Congo State by the Berlin Treaty of 1885, of the creation of Albania by the Treaty of London of 1913 as well as the recognition of her independence by the Conference of Ambassadors in 1921, and the various instances of collective recognition of new States by the Allied Powers after the War of 1914-1918.' Moreover, diplomatic practice shows that, as in the case of recognition of governments, recognition of States, even when granted separately, is often preceded by negotiations aimed at establishing a common line of action. The attempts made by Great Britain to secure at the Congress of Verona joint action with other European Powers in the matter of the recognition of the Latin-American States, as well as the attempts of the United States to secure the cobperation of Great Britain in the same matter, may be mentioned as examples.

International Courts as Agencies of Recognition. It is not believed that a promising avenue of progress would lie in conferring upon the highest international judicial authority the power to grant recognition on the application of the community claiming it. On the face of it, this would seem to be the natural course. It would appear that a function consisting in the application of international law and in the ascertainment of the existence of requisite conditions of fact may and ought properly to be fulfilled by a judicial organ of the highest authority and impartiality. There is no doubt that so far as its Statute, including the rules of law applicable thereunder, is concerned, the Permanent Court of International Justice would be in a position to act in that capacity. Yet it seems undesirable to burden the Court with a task whose implications and the circumstances of whose performance are of capital political significance. This applies in particular to cases where the question of recognition of States arises in connection with a revolt against and secession from the parent State. For these reasons it is, from the practical point of view, more appropriate that this particular function of applying the law should be performed not by the judicial, but by the highest executive or legislative organs of the international community. The Court might still make

a useful contribution in pronouncing by way of advisory opinions or in a similar capacity on any questions of law incidental to recognition. Neither do objections apply to the ability and the propriety of the Court's giving redress in the form of compensation for injury actually suffered for arbitrary delay of recognition by one State in face of practically universal recognition by other States. In this connection the claim of the United States in the case of the Bergen Prizes, a case of non-recognition of belligerency, is of some interest."'

Municipal Courts and the Function of Recognition. The foregoing considerations explain also why no amelioration of the present position can be expected from transferring the function of recognition to municipal courts as distinguished from the executive organs of the State. Moreover, the possibility must be envisaged of different tribunals of the same State reaching different conclusions as to the existence of the requirements of statehood in any given case. In addition, the contingency would still remain of the courts of various countries arriving at divergent views on the matter

It is convenient in this connection to consider the criticism which has been levelled against two principles-one of a procedural, the other of a substantive nature-obtaining in Great Britain and in the United States, as well as in other States in the matter of recognition. The procedural rule of unchallenged authority is that in the matter of recognition as on other questions relating to foreign affairs, the position taken up by the executive department of government is of decisive weight. The question whether a foreign community exists as a State in the contemplation of international law is answered by the courts in strict relianceupon the statement of the Executive informing the court whether and to what extent recognition has been granted. The practical justification of that procedural principle is that it would be inconvenient for the State and its neighbors if its various organs were to assume divergent positions in the matter of its external relations."' It is proper that courts